Assertion, Lying, and Untruthfully Implicating by Pepp, Jessica
 
1 
Assertion, Lying, and Untruthfully Implicating 
Jessica Pepp 
Uppsala University 
(This is a draft of a chapter for The Oxford Handbook of Assertion, ed. S. Goldberg, Oxford 
University Press) 
1. Introduction 
Suppose that Gloria recently lost her job due to a personality clash with her boss. 
Suppose also that she is highly regarded in her field and already knows of several firms 
interested in hiring her, so she is not worried about her future employment situation. 
Gloria’s father, however, worries a lot, and she suspects that knowing about her situation 
would cause him great unease. When he asks (as he often does) about her employment 
situation, she might reply, "I still have a job, don't worry," thereby lying to him. Or she might 
reply, "The company made a lot of cuts recently, but I wasn't affected by them." This would 
be a truthful assertion (assuming the company did make cuts, and assuming it was not the 
cuts that affected Gloria, but the personality clash). However, in saying this Gloria would 
implicate that she still has a job, which she believes not to be the case. She would untruthfully 
implicate, but she would not lie. 
The difference between lying and untruthfully implicating is often taken to be morally 
significant. Contemporary philosophers often claim that people have a preference for 
untruthfully implicating over lying, and that people tend to believe that lying is morally 
worse than untruthfully implicating (other things being equal).1 One study in behavioral 
economics provides some empirical evidence for this preference (though not specifically for 
the belief in moral difference). 2  Prominent philosophical and religious traditions treat 
avoidance of lying by resort to untruthful implicating as morally commendable.3 And I 
                                                        
1 See for example: Jennifer Saul (2012), Andreas Stokke’s (2013) review of Saul, Melissa MacAulay and 
Robert Stainton’s (2013) review of Saul, Jonathan Adler (1997), Roderick Chisholm and Thomas Feehan 
(1977), and Alan Strudler (2010). 
2 See Uyanga Turmunkh, Martijn van den Assem, and Denni van Dolder (2017). 
3 For instance, the Kantian and Augustinian traditions. See Macintyre (1995) for discussion. 
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would guess that most of us can recall occasions on which we have carefully avoided lying 
by implying something we do not believe rather than coming out and asserting it.  
But while morally relevant similarities between lying and untruthfully implicating are 
readily apparent (for instance: both are typically deceptive, manipulative, or harmful to 
one's interlocutor), morally relevant differences are harder to identify. The intuition that the 
difference between lying and untruthfully implicating is morally significant—what I will 
call the "Difference Intuition"—calls out for justification.   
This chapter explores the prospects for justifying the Difference Intuition. I begin, in 
section 2, by getting clearer on the difference between lying and untruthfully implicating, 
and the role that assertion plays in making this difference. Then, in section 3, I set out 
various ways of sharpening the Difference Intuition. In section 4, I survey a range of 
approaches to justifying one class of sharpenings of the Difference Intuition. In section 5, I 
sketch an approach to justifying an alternative sharpening of the Difference Intuition, which 
is inspired by John Stuart Mill's discussion of lying. Section 6 concludes.  
2. Assertion, Lying and Untruthfully Implicating 
Lying is often defined in terms of assertion, along the following lines: 
To lie is to assert that something is the case while believing that it is not the case.  
This definition of lying requires a notion of assertion that rules out asserting 
something ironically, in jest, in a play, metaphorically, by accident, or in any other way that 
would allow for asserting something one believes is not the case without lying. Different 
notions of assertion might be imported into the definition of lying in order to do this work.4  
Alternatively, lying can be defined in terms of a thinner notion of assertion, with an 
additional requirement to prevent instances of speaking ironically, jokingly, and so on from 
counting as lies. For instance, the third clause of Jennifer Saul's definition of lying does this 
                                                        
4 For instance, Stokke's (2013) definition of lying follows Stalnaker (2002) in treating asserting as proposing 
to add information to the conversational common ground. Keiser's (2016) definition of lying follows Bach 
and Harnish (1979) in treating assertion as the expression of belief, where expression of a belief involves 




If the speaker is not the victim of linguistic error/malapropism or using metaphor, 
hyperbole, or irony, then they lie iff (1) they say that P; (2) they believe P to be false; 
(3) they take themself to be in a warranting context.5 
To take oneself to be in a warranting context is to take oneself to be in a context in which 
one implicitly guarantees the truth of what one says (unlike in contexts of joking or acting).6 
Hence, one way to view Saul's definition of lying is as a definition based on a more 
substantive notion of assertion, according to which assertion involves making a certain kind 
of commitment or guarantee.  
The literature on how lying should be defined is expansive, offering many candidate 
definitions to choose from.7 I will just mention two features of the basic definition I gave 
above that could be varied. First, the definition does not require that what one asserts is not 
the case (but only that one believe that it is not the case). Second, the definition does require 
that one believe that it is not the case (instead of only requiring that one not believe that it is 
the case). 8  It would not substantially affect the discussion of this chapter to make the 
opposite choice on either of these features. 
By requiring that a speaker assert that something is the case, most definitions of lying 
differentiate it from various other ways that one might convey that something is the case 
while believing that it is not the case. The verb "implicate" and the noun "implicature" are 
used to refer to various ways of meaning9 that something is the case without asserting that 
it is the case. Implicature is often divided, following Paul Grice,10 into conventional and 
                                                        
5 Saul (2012: 3). 
6 Saul follows Carson (2006) in using this notion of warrant to define lying.  
7 For a thorough taxonomy of definitions of lying and considerations for and against the various 
definitions, see Mahon (2016).   
8 This ensures that cases of what might most naturally be called "bullshitting" will not qualify as lying 
according to this definition. It may also rule out some assertions that are intuitively lies. (See Carson 2006: 
286.) Shiffrin (2014: 13) claims that asserting without qualification something about which one has no 
opinion is lying, as when someone answers a request for the day's news by making up an event whose 
occurrence or non-occurrence she has no view about it. Sorensen (2011: 407) makes a similar point using 
the following example: "a father flips a coin and appears to peek at it (actually, he is too nearsighted to 
make out whether it is heads). He whispers to his son, 'It is heads.' He whispers to his daughter, 'It is 
tails.'" Sorensen's view is that the father lies both times, although he has no opinion about which way the 
coin landed. How these cases should be categorized is tangential to the concerns of this chapter. 
9 Here I use "meaning" in the sense that Grice (1957) called "non-natural meaning." It is now often called 
"speaker meaning." I am not going to offer or endorse any particular account of speaker meaning. I only 
point to it as something speakers do. There are ways of conveying that something is the case without 
meaning that it is. For instance, one might act as if something is the case.   
10 Grice (1984). 
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conversational implicature. Conventional implicature, as in an assertion of, "He is an 
Englishman; he is, therefore, brave," is determined by the linguistic conventions associated 
with the words used; conversational implicature, as in the example of Gloria in the previous 
section, is determined by conversational norms. Mitchell Green points out that there is also 
room for a notion of non-conventional, non-conversational implicature, as when one means 
that one dislikes a film by making a sour face at the mention of its title.11 With any type of 
implicature, one may implicate that something is the case while believing that it is not the 
case: one may untruthfully implicate. 
Just as, on a thin notion of assertion, one might assert in a play, in jest, ironically, and 
so on, one might also implicate in these ways. To play on one of Grice's famous examples of 
implicature, suppose that Smith objects fervently to the existence of the university 
cheerleading squad and has been spending his days protesting outside their clubhouse. If 
A says to B, "Smith doesn't seem to have a girlfriend these days," and B replies "He has been 
paying a lot of visits to the cheerleading clubhouse lately," then B implies that Smith has a 
girlfriend on the cheerleading squad, but only in jest. A and B both assume that Smith would 
never date a cheerleader. But what B does here is not the kind of untruthful implicating that 
is to be compared with lying. Rather, the acts of implicating that constitute the comparison 
class of untruthful implicature must fulfill the same sort of conditions (expressing a belief, 
proposing to add information to the common ground, committing to the truth of what is 
implicated, or the like) as the acts of asserting that constitute lying.12   
One further complication in comparing lying and untruthfully implicating is due to 
the fact that implicating often consists in giving reasons for drawing some conclusion, 
without stating the conclusion. In such cases, often what is implicated is that something may 
be, or is likely to be, the case, rather than that it is the case. Consider Grice's original 
girlfriend case:   
A: Smith doesn't seem to have a girlfriend these days. 
B: He has been paying a lot of visits to New York lately. 
(Grice 1989: 32) 
As Grice put it, "B implicates that Smith has, or may have, a girlfriend in New York." 
                                                        
11 Green (2007: 100). 
12 We will also have to decide whether what is implicated must not be the case, or must only be believed 
not to be the case, and whether it must be believed not to be the case or only not believed to be the case. 
Again, I do not think these choices will matter for the present discussion. 
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(emphasis added) How hedged B's implicature is might depend on aspects of his delivery, 
such as whether he smiles knowingly or shrugs uncertainly. That some cases of implicature 
are hedged might make it seem as though implicating in general signals uncertainty, as 
compared with asserting. This in turn might suggest that untruthfully implicating is morally 
preferable to lying because it gives the hearer fair warning not to rely too much on what is 
implicated. But implicating does not in general signal uncertainty: consider Grice's example 
of the reference letter writer who writes, "Mr. X's command of English is excellent and he 
always comes on time to tutorials," or Jennifer Saul's example of Bill Clinton's famous 
assertion, "There is no sexual relationship." These speakers do not implicate that Mr. X might 
be bad at philosophy or that there might never have been a sexual relationship, they 
implicate these things in an unhedged way. If these implicatures are morally preferable to 
the corresponding outright lies, it is not because the former indicate some sort of uncertainty 
or hedging while the latter do not. In cases of untruthfully implicating where the implicating 
is hedged (for instance, if B in Grice's case believed that Smith does not have a girlfriend in 
New York), the relevant comparison would be with a case in which the corresponding 
assertion is similarly hedged (for instance, if B asserted that it might be that Smith has a 
girlfriend in New York13).  
To summarize: the distinction between lying and untruthfully implicating whose 
moral significance is at issue is the difference between asserting (where assertion is 
understood in some sense that rules out joking, speaking ironically, etc.), in an unhedged 
way, that something is the case although you believe that it is not the case, and meaning 
(also understood in a sense that rules out joking, etc.), also in an unhedged way, without 
asserting, that something is the case although you believe that it is not the case. (As 
suggested above, readers should feel free to add the requirement that what is asserted in 
fact not be the case, or to substitute the requirement that what is asserted not be believed to be 
the case in place of the requirement that it be believed not to be the case.)  
3. The Intuition of Moral Difference 
So far, I have formulated the Difference Intuition loosely, as the intuition that the 
difference between lying and untruthfully implicating is morally significant. This intuition 
might be made more precise, so as to be a suitable target for justification, in different ways.   
                                                        
13 I am not sure whether we would intuitively count such a hedged untruthful assertion as a lie or not.   
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One way is to make a universal claim about pairs of contrast cases.  One might claim 
that whenever two (possible) cases differ only in that one is a case of lying that p, while the 
other is a case of untruthfully implicating that p, the act in the first case is worse than the act 
in the second case. This seems to be the approach of Saul (and others in the recent debate 
surrounding her book), who sharpens the Difference Intuition to: 
(M) Holding all else fixed, lying is morally worse than merely deliberately attempting 
to mislead; and successful lying is morally worse than merely deliberately 
misleading.14 
It is clear from the counterexamples to M that Saul adduces that she intends M as a 
universal claim across pairs of contrast cases. One such counterexample is a pair of cases in 
which a murderous chef has cooked dinner in peanut oil for his guest, who is deathly 
allergic to peanuts. In one case, when asked whether the dinner contains peanuts, the 
murderous chef replies "No, I didn't put any peanuts in," and in the other case he replies, 
"No, it's perfectly safe for you to eat." Saul's intuition is that the chef's act of lying in the 
second case is no worse than his act of untruthfully implicating in the first case. She takes 
this to show that M is false. 
Saul recognizes that such counterexamples could be parried by arguing that although 
there is a moral difference between the cases, the moral status of both acts is so extreme that 
our intuition is unable to pick up the difference. But she also proposes as a more plausible 
sharpening of the Difference Intuition the following thesis: 
(M-D) Except in certain special cases: holding all else fixed, lying is morally worse 
than merely deliberately attempting to mislead; and successful lying is morally worse 
than merely deliberately misleading.15 
This thesis allows for some contrast pairs in which the lying/attempting to mislead 
                                                        
14 (Saul 2012: 72). Although Saul contrasts lying with attempting to mislead, rather than with untruthfully 
implicating, her focus seems to be almost entirely on attempting to mislead by untruthfully implicating. 
Indeed, she suggests that attempting to mislead by acting as though something is the case, rather than by 
meaning that it is the case, might well be morally better than lying and at any rate is not the kind of 
"linguistic deception" with which she is interested in comparing lying. (75-77)  
A further note about Saul's (M) is that attempting to mislead (or deceive) by untruthfully implicating is 
not obviously the appropriate contrast with lying. There is a growing consensus that not all lies are 
attempts to mislead or deceive the audience. (See the discussion of bald-faced lies and other forms of 
non-deceptive lying in Carson (2006), Fallis (2009), and Sorensen (2007).) Accordingly, the moral 
significance of lying may not depend on its being a means of deceiving. (See Stokke, forthcoming and 
Shiffrin 2014 for ethical accounts of lying that do not place deception at the center.) Given this, the 
relevant contrast to evaluate for moral significance is not the contrast between lying, on the one hand, 
and attempting to mislead or deceive (without lying), on the other, but between lying and untruthfully 
implicating, regardless of deceptive intent.  
15 Saul (2012: 74). 
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(i.e. untruthfully implicating) difference does not make for a difference in the moral status 
of the two acts. 
One might also think that although the difference between lying and untruthfully 
implicating is morally significant, it need not typically or most of the time make a difference 
in the moral status of contrast pairs, but need only do so in some cases. (As Shelly Kagan 
has argued, it is not obvious that a difference between two ways of behaving can make a 
difference in the moral status of some pairs of contrast cases only if it makes a difference in 
the moral status of all—or even most—contrast pairs.16 ) Hence, one might sharpen the 
Difference Intuition as follows: 
At least for some pairs of cases: holding all else fixed, lying is morally worse than 
untruthfully implicating.  
Finally, the Difference Intuition might be sharpened without appeal to pairs of 
contrast cases. One might claim that when faced with a need to convey that something is 
the case despite believing that it is not, it is good moral practice to untruthfully implicate 
rather than lie. This might be so even if there are no pairs of contrast cases in which the case 
of lying is morally worse than the case of untruthfully implicating. (For instance, a 
maximizing act consequentialist might hold that no lying/untruthfully implicating contrast 
pairs display a difference in moral status, given that total outcomes of the relevant acts are 
held fixed across the cases. Nonetheless, they might advocate a rule of thumb or decision 
procedure favoring untruthfully implicating over lying.17)   
 I mentioned in the Introduction that many philosophers claim to have the Difference 
Intuition (in one form or another), and that it seems to them to be widespread. However, I 
am not aware of any clear evidence that the intuition is (or is not) widespread. Anecdotally, 
I find that most people I ask do acknowledge at least a weak form of the intuition, but some 
say that they cannot see any moral difference, or even that they have the opposite intuition, 
that untruthful implicating seems morally worse than lying.18  This "Reverse Difference 
Intuition" could be sharpened in all the same ways as I have described for the Difference 
Intuition.  
                                                        
16 Kagan (1988: 12-14). 
17 I discuss justification of the Difference Intuition along these lines in section 5. 
18 These intuitions support the argument of Clea Rees (2015), that in ordinary conversational settings lying 
is morally better than attempting to mislead by untruthfully implicating. 
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4. Approaches to Justifying the Difference Intuition 
The first three sharpenings of the Difference Intuition that I discussed in the previous 
section claim, respectively, that an act of lying always has, typically has, or sometimes has 
a different moral status from the corresponding act of untruthfully implicating, assuming 
everything else is held fixed. In this section, I will discuss three broad approaches to 
justifying such claims. The first approach is to try to show that there are different morally 
relevant factors in cases of lying as compared with cases of untruthfully implicating. The 
second is to try to show that although the morally relevant factors are of the same kind in 
both cases, they differ in degree. The third approach eschews the weighing of morally 
relevant factors in determining an act's moral status, aiming instead to identify fundamental 
moral principles that lying, but not untruthfully implicating, violates. I will explore the 
prospects for each of these broad approaches in turn.   
4.1. Different morally relevant factors  
One tempting suggestion is that doing harm is a morally relevant factor in (at least many 
cases of) lying, but not in untruthfully implicating, where one merely allows harm.19 It 
might be thought that because the untruthful implicater leaves the hearer to draw her own 
inferences, the communication to the hearer that something is the case which the untruthful 
implicater believes is not the case is not really something the untruthful implicater does. But 
this is not right: communicating that something is the case is exactly what an implicater 
attempts to do in implicating that it is the case, just as much as when she asserts outright 
that it is the case. Either way, some participation on the hearer's part is required, as hearers 
must make inferences in order to understand assertions (e.g. they must make inferences 
about what names, indexicals, and ambiguous words refer to). And in both kinds of case, 
these inferences are often quite automatic.20 To whatever extent one does harm by lying on 
a given occasion, one would also do harm by the corresponding act of untruthfully 
implicating (holding other things fixed). 
A different way to make a case for a difference in the morally relevant factors in lying 
and in untruthfully implicating is to appeal to the nature of assertion. On some views, part 
                                                        
19 Both Jonathan Adler (1997: 446) and Bernard Williams (2002: 101) observe a surface similarity between 
the lying/untruthfully implicating distinction and the doing/allowing distinction.  
20 Saul makes both of these points. (2012: 80-81) 
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of what makes an act be an assertion that something is the case is the fact that the speaker 
incurs certain responsibilities for its being the case.21 These responsibilities are not usually 
taken to be moral responsibilities, but rather normative responsibilities of some other stripe, 
such as epistemic responsibilities or perhaps just conversational responsibilities.22  
In this vein, Jonathan Adler argues that the practice of assertion is governed by a 
"demand of truthfulness." He illustrates this demand by observing that it is fair to challenge 
an assertion by asking the asserter how she knows or what her evidence is. By contrast, 
challenges like this are not appropriate for implicatures, indicating that our linguistic 
practice does not place the same "demand of truthfulness" on implicating. Although the 
norms of our linguistic practice are not themselves moral norms, they have "moral force" or 
"normative weight" because they are "mutually expected, rational, and tacitly endorsed."23 
Failing to abide by such norms is morally significant—perhaps because it is a violation of 
fairness.24 Since there is such a norm that demands (inter alia) that one believe what one 
asserts, but no such norm that demands that one believe what one implicates, lying is 
morally significant in at least one way that untruthfully implicating is not.25  
A similar suggestion to Adler's is made by Matthew Benton, who derives a norm 
against lying from the "epistemic norm of assertion", by which he means a "social linguistic 
rule" that specifies a necessary condition for assertion to be epistemically proper.26 Given 
                                                        
21 Examples include Searle (1969), Brandom (1994), and Rescorla (2009). Saul's and Carson's appeal to 
warranting in their definitions of lying also suggest a view of assertion along these lines. (See note 6.)  
22 One exception is Terence Cuneo's (2014) view of speech acts. According to Cuneo, what makes an action 
be an assertion that something is the case is, in part, the fact that the agent acquires moral responsibilities 
for things being as she asserts that they are. Cuneo does not discuss implicature, but one can imagine a 
justification of the Difference Intuition within his framework along the following lines: Part of what it is 
to assert that something is the case is to acquire a moral responsibility for it being the case. Acquiring a 
moral responsibility for something's being the case is not part of what it is to implicate that it is the case. 
Hence, lying violates a moral responsibility that untruthfully implicating does not violate. However, I 
think such a rationale would be problematic for parallel reasons to those I am about to adduce against 
Adler's justification. Namely, it is not clear why an advocate of Cuneo's view should deny that what it is 
to implicate, at least in the "thick" sense with which we are concerned (see Section 2) and which parallels 
Cuneo's notion of assertion, is in part to acquire moral responsibilities for what one implicates being the 
case. Of course, one could insist that this responsibility is lesser or absent in the case of implicature, but 
this would simply be to restate the Difference Intuition in the context of the theory, not to justify it.  
23 Adler (1997: 449-51). 
24 Adler does not defend the move from the norms of some practice being mutually known and endorsed to 
their having moral significance, but he does refer to the differential norms of asserting and implicating as 
a "fair understanding." For a defense of the move from mutually manifest norms (of the practice of 
assertion, specifically) to moral significance, see Goldberg (2015: 175-80).  
25 Stuart Green seems to take a similar line, though he puts the point in terms of a "warranty of truth" being 
given by an asserter but not by an implicater. (Green 2006: 79) 
26 Candidate conditions include knowing that what one asserts is true, believing it, or having sufficient 
evidence for it.  
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that some such rule is in place, asserting that something is the case while believing that one 
does not meet the specified requirement is epistemically "vicious."27 However, according to 
Benton, "one does not undertake the same epistemic responsibility by conversationally 
implicating that p as when one asserts that p with full force." 
Whatever the merits of the idea that failing to abide by mutually endorsed rules of 
conversation is morally significant, it is not clear that such rules in fact treat asserting and 
implicating so differently. To demonstrate that they do, Adler appeals to the fact that 
implicature can be used to make available information that one is not prepared to fully 
defend, as when one offers one's evidence for a conclusion, intending the hearer to draw the 
conclusion herself. Adler compares this to saying, "It may be that p." But, as discussed in 
section 2, it is not the fact that one is implicating rather than asserting that makes such 
implicatures have a hedged character. Rather, other features of the context and manner of 
expression accomplish this. Implicatures are not in general hedged, so it is not clear why 
the demands of truthfulness for implicature would in general be less.  
Adler and Benton also appeal, respectively, to the inappropriateness of challenges to 
implicatures and to the availability of replies like "I never said that." But while it might be 
inappropriate to challenge an implicature by asking "Why do you think that?" or "How do 
you know that?", similar challenges that acknowledge how the implicature was made are 
appropriate. Here are some examples: 
i.  Girlfriend-in-New-York example: 
  A: Smith doesn't seem to have a girlfriend these days. 
  B: He's been paying a lot of visits to New York lately.  
  (Imagine this said archly, so as not to suggest hedging or uncertainty.) 
  A: Why do you think that means he has a girlfriend there? 
 
ii. Deathbed question example: 
  Woman on her deathbed: Is my son alright? 
                                                        
27 Benton (forthcoming). It is not entirely clear whether Benton takes this epistemic viciousness to be morally 
significant. He says that the viciousness is "primarily epistemic," and thus exhibited even by lies 
"undertaken with high moral or social aims." But he also says that when people rely on lying testimony, 
"it's not just that one's epistemic position is compromised; the social goodwill we have toward others, 
especially those with whom we have ongoing relationships, is strained." 
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  Kindly companion: I saw him yesterday and he was just fine. 
  Woman on her deathbed: How do you know nothing terrible happened to him today? 
 
iii. Marriage and children example: 
  A: John and Jane got married and had a baby. 
  B: How do you know it happened in that order? 
 
These interactions suggest that the demand of truthfulness (or for appropriate 
epistemic authority) applies to implicatures as well. It is true that the challenged speaker in 
each example can reply, "I didn't say that." But this does not seem to respond to the 
challenge, which demands the speaker's grounds for implicating, not her grounds for 
asserting. The challenged speaker could respond more directly to the challenge by saying, 
"I didn't mean to imply that." But a speaker challenged on an assertion might equally 
respond with "I didn't mean to say that." Both responses seem to acknowledge a 
responsibility to defend the assertion or implicature that the hearer took the speaker to have 
made, if the speaker had in fact made it. 
As far as I can tell, conversational norms no more allow for untruthfully implicating 
than they allow for lying. Thus, I do not see a viable defense of the idea that lying, but not 
untruthfully implicating, is morally significant in virtue of being a failure to play by the 
rules of a mutually endorsed conversational practice.  
4.2. Same morally relevant factors, different degrees 
I noted at the beginning of the chapter that morally relevant similarities between lying 
and untruthfully implicating are easy to identify. Accordingly, some philosophers think that 
the same factors are morally relevant across the two types of act, but that they differ in 
degree. 
For example, Alan Strudler argues that what is inherently morally significant about 
both lies and untruthful implicatures is that they are attempts to breach the trust of another 
person. Whether one asserts that something is the case or implicates that it is the case, one 
invites the hearer to trust that one is a cooperative communicator, and thus that one believes 
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that what one asserts or implicates is in fact the case. If one believes that what one asserts or 
implicates is not the case, one intends to violate the very trust one is inviting.28      
Nonetheless, Strudler argues that in asserting that something is the case, one invites a 
greater trust from the hearer than one would in implicating that it is the case. Strudler 
proposes that, other things equal, levels of trust correlate with levels of ceded control. And, 
he argues, trusting an assertion involves ceding more control than trusting an implicature. 
This is because in trusting an assertion one gives up the option to raise a doubt about what 
is asserted without sacrificing the trusting nature of the conversation. 29  Here is an 
illustration of the contrast, using an adaptation of Strudler's central example: 
a. Raising a doubt about what is implicated; no loss of trust 
  Prospective house buyer: This would be a great neighborhood for my kids. 
  House seller: So you intend to move into this house with your family? 
b. Raising a doubt about what is asserted; loss of trust 
  Prospective house buyer: I intend to move into this house with my family. 
  House seller: Really, you do? 
Strudler's claim is that the buyer asks the seller to trust him more—to surrender more 
of her options—by asserting, as in case b, than by implicating, as in case a. Thus, if the buyer 
does not intend to move into the house with his family, asserting this is a greater violation 
of trust than implicating it. 
                                                        
28 Strudler (2010: 173-4). Hinchman (2005) analyzes telling (a sub-class of asserting) as an invitation to trust. 
Unlike Strudler, it does not seem that Hinchman would extend this analysis to include implicating. For 
Hinchman maintains that in conveying to someone that something is the case by means other than telling 
them so, one does not invite them to trust one about that matter. His grounds for this seems to be that 
invitations to trust come with responsibilities to justify one's claim to the invited person, should one be 
challenged. But if one does not tell one's audience that something is the case, then the audience is not 
entitled to hold one accountable for producing a reason to believe that it is the case. (568-9) I take it that the 
examples adduced in section 4.1 cast doubt on this claim, at least as it applies to implicatures. Hinchman, 
in fairness, focuses on cases of asserting that something is the case without telling a particular person that 
it is the case, for instance by telling someone else that it is the case within the first person's earshot. 
Hinchman may be right that in such a case the first person is not entitled to hold the speaker to account. 
Implicating is different because it is addressed to the person in question. 
 Without addressing Hinchman specifically, Strudler argues that implicating, in addition to telling, also 
invites trust because it relies on inviting your interlocutor to treat you as a cooperative communicator, 
which is a way of inviting trust. 
29 Strudler (2010: 175-6). 
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The problem with this rationale is that while raising doubts about what is asserted 
sometimes breaks down trust, and raising doubts about what is implicated sometimes does 
not, the reverse seems just as likely. Even with cases a and b, one can imagine it going either 
way. If, in case a, it is perfectly clear that the buyer is presenting himself as considering the 
house as a future home for his family, the seller's question will sound unduly suspicious 
and will likely break down trust. In case b, the seller's question might come off as suspicious, 
but it also might come off as surprised and curious—a request for some further explanation 
of what was asserted.30 In general, it does not seem that assertions invite a greater surrender 
of trust-preserving conversational options than implicating. Hence, there is no reason to 
think that lying is a greater violation of trust. 
Reversing Strudler's claim, Clea Rees argues that untruthfully implicating is generally a 
greater violation of trust than lying, at least in "contexts characterized by standard 
assumptions of communicative cooperation."31 Granted, there are special contexts (courts of 
law, business negotiations, certain governmental forums, adversarial interviews, etc.) 
where it is expected that people will both aim to deceive if it benefits them, and aim to avoid 
lying. (Bernard Williams calls these contexts "adversarial but rule-governed,"32 a label which 
I will adopt.) In such contexts, Rees allows, lying is generally morally worse than 
untruthfully implicating. But in standard contexts, she claims, trusting both the assertions 
and implicatures of our interlocutors is an epistemic and moral obligation, unless we have 
specific reasons for distrust. Thus, when we assert or implicate that something is the case, 
we generate an obligation on the part of our interlocutor to trust us (assuming they have no 
specific reason for distrust).33 This means that in trusting our implicatures, our interlocutors 
need to exercise "the moral and epistemic goodwill required to presume [us] fully 
                                                        
30 Saul (2012: 78-80) criticizes Strudler's argument in a similar vein, although she focuses on whether lying 
and untruthfully implicating differ in their likelihood of breaking down productive exchange once the lie 
or untruthful implicature has been revealed. Strudler's point, though, is not that revealed lies are more 
destructive of productive exchange than revealed untruthful implicatures, but that lies (revealed or not) 
are greater violations of trust than untruthful implicatures.  
31 Rees (2013: 64). 
32 Williams (2002: 109). 
33 Here Rees takes strong positions on the epistemology and morality of testimony without extended 
discussion of the broader literature on these topics. She says that the epistemic obligation to trust both 
assertions and implicatures, absent specific reasons for distrust, is grounded in the fact that "responsible 
epistemic agents are epistemically interdependent and epistemic cooperation requires presuming fellow 
conversants cooperative." The moral obligation to trust both assertions and implicatures, absent specific 
reasons for distrust, is grounded in the fact that "not only does moral knowledge depend on epistemic 
cooperation, but communication is itself crucial to the flourishing of social creatures like us. Moreover, 
treating others with appropriate respect requires presuming them trustworthy in the absence of evidence 
to the contrary..." (61). The claim that such obligations (epistemic or moral) are present in ordinary 
communicative contexts is (at least) highly controversial, but I do not have space to discuss it here. As I 
explain in the text, there are problems with Rees's account even if these claims are accepted.   
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cooperative conversational partners," whereas to trust our assertions, they need muster only 
"the minimal trust involved in assuming others' assertions to be honest." Thus, in 
implicating, we obligate others to trust us more extensively, making it a more severe 
violation of this trust if we do not believe what we implicate. 
Rees's reversal of the usual starting point that lying is intuitively morally worse is 
interesting. But the argument is problematic. Suppose Rees is right that in standard contexts, 
and absent specific reasons for distrust, hearers have an epistemic and moral obligation to 
treat speakers as fully cooperative conversational partners, trusting both their assertions 
and their implicatures. Then in such contexts the trust that is violated either by a lie or by 
an untruthful implicature is the same robust trust. It is true that this trust is greater than the 
trust that is violated by lying in adversarial but rule-governed contexts. But this does not 
imply a difference within a standard context between the trust violated by untruthfully 
implicating and the trust violated by lying. 
I will round out this section with a suggestion for justifying the Difference Intuition from 
the perspective of care ethics. Broadly speaking, care ethics takes the caringness of the 
attutide or motivation with which an act is performed as the central factor relevant to the 
moral status of the act. In one development of this kind of view, on which caring is 
understood in terms of empathy, Michael Slote argues that those who kill innocents "in cold 
blood," face to face, exhibit a greater lack of empathy than those who kill innocents at a 
distance (for example, from an airplane). On Slote's view, this makes killing in cold blood 
morally worse than killing at a distance.34 Slote does not discuss the lying/untruthfully 
implicating distinction, but one can imagine a parallel rationale for seeing lying as morally 
worse. Putting it a bit figuratively: when you lie to someone, you hear (or see) quite 
immediately your presentation of things as being a way that you do not take them to be. 
You do not have to imagine your audience's processing of an implicature, and you cannot 
distract yourself by focusing on truthful assertions that you might use to effect an 
implicature. You are face to face with your delivery to your interlocutor of (what you take 
to be) a falsehood. If (and when) lying involves a lack of empathy for your interlocutor,35 it 
might be that the corresponding untruthful implicature would involve a lesser lack of 
empathy, since it would not require as direct an awareness of the offense done to the 
                                                        
34 Slote (2007: 25). 
35 Slote has an account of the ways in which lying can display a lack of empathy, but the details are not 
important for the present point. (2007: 52-3) 
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interlocutor. Thus, it might be that on Slote's view untruthfully implicating is morally better.  
The evaluation of this suggestion (which, again, is not one that Slote himself makes) 
seems to me to depend on answering partially empirical questions about empathy (for 
instance, is empathy involved in our apparent preference for lying over untruthfully 
implicating?). It also, and more critically, depends on assessing the view that empathy is a, 
or perhaps the, central morally relevant factor in determining an act's moral status. Both of 
these tasks are beyond the scope of this paper. I will rest with identifying this as a potential 
route for justifying the Difference Intuition. 
4.3. Fundamental Moral Principles 
Some normative ethical views are best seen as articulating fundamental moral 
principles, rather than as identifying and weighing up morally relevant factors. Kantian 
ethics is perhaps the central exemplar, especially in discussions of lying. Kant himself seems 
to have held that lying is worse than untruthfully implicating—indeed, that lying is 
absolutely forbidden while untruthfully implicating is often permissible.36 It is less clear on 
what grounds he held this. 
Alasdair Macintyre reads Kant as holding that "my duty is to assert only what is true 
and that the mistaken inferences that others may draw from what I say or what I do are, in 
some cases at least, not my responsibility."37 Macintyre goes on to say that one might be 
tempted to think it is the non-universalizability of the maxim that tells one to lie whenever 
it is convenient that, for Kant, grounds the duty not to assert what one takes to be false. 
Non-universalizability might also be tempting as a tool for justifying the moral difference 
between lying and untruthfully implicating.38 I am not aware of any previous attempts to 
do this, but how might one go? One way might be to argue that universalization of the 
maxim, "lie whenever it is convenient," would yield the maxim that everyone lies whenever 
it is convenient. But if everyone lied whenever it was convenient, no one would ever take 
seriously anything that was said, so it would be impossible to assert anything, and so 
impossible to lie. Hence, in acting on the maxim that she lie whenever it is convenient, the 
                                                        
36 See Macintyre (1995: 336-7) for discussion. 
37 Macintyre (1995: 337). 
38 At least, whenever I discuss the Difference Intuition with philosophers, someone suggests that Kantians 
might use a difference in universalizability to justify it.  
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liar cannot simultaneously and without contradiction will that this maxim become a 
universal law. This "contradiction in conception" generates, in the Kantian framework, a 
perfect duty not to lie.  
Suppose we grant this rationale for a perfect duty not to lie.39 What would be the 
grounds for thinking that a duty against untruthfully implicating could not be generated in 
the same way? The untruthful implicater's maxim would be something like, "untruthfully 
implicate whenever it is convenient." The universalization of this would be that everyone 
untruthfully implicates whenever it is convenient. If it is right that universal lying-when-
convenient would result in no one ever taking seriously anything that is asserted, it should 
also be plausible that universal untruthfully-implicating-when-convenient would result in 
no one ever taking seriously anything that is implicated. (This is something like what 
happens in the adversarial but rule-governed contexts discussed in the previous section.) 
Further, if it is right that the former result would mean that assertion, and thus lying, would 
become impossible, it seems equally plausible that the latter result would mean that 
implicature, and thus untruthful implicature, would become impossible.40  
A different way of justifying the Difference Intuition on universalizability grounds 
might start by arguing that universalization of the liar's maxim yields a "contradiction in 
willing," rather than a contradiction in conception. A maxim is said to lead to a contradiction 
in willing if the agent cannot rationally will that it be universalized (even if the 
universalization does not defeat the agent's purpose in acting, as in a contradiction in 
conception). Seana Shiffrin suggests such a view of the wrong in lying: 
...If universalized, [the liar's] maxim transforms a mechanism for exclusively 
conveying the truth into a mechanism for conveying both the false and the true. 
In this case, versatility is a vice. By doing so, one has eliminated a fail-proof, 
trustworthy mode of access to one another. Because there are no external methods of 
                                                        
39 Pace Macintyre, who follows Korsgaard (1986) in rejecting universalizability considerations as grounding 
the duty against lying. 
40 In this scenario it would still be possible to make and derive implicatures in the sense of creating and 
taking opportunities to infer from a speaker's assertions and other contextual factors to what she would 
intend to communicate if she were being cooperative. But this would not be the robust kind of 
implicature that parallels the robust kind of assertion needed for lying. (See Section 2 above.) In the same 
way, in the scenario where the liar's maxim is universalized it might still be possible to assert things in 
the sense of uttering sentences with a certain meaning, but (according to the rationale under discussion) 
not to engage in the robust kind of assertion needed for lying. In a situation where no implicatures are 
taken seriously, one would expect conversants to demand that anything a speaker intends to 
communicate be explicitly asserted. Implicating would no longer be a viable way of communicating that 
something is the case, at least no more so than asserting would remain a viable way of communicating 
that something is the case in the scenario where the liar's maxim is universalized. (Here I leave aside the 
question of whether it is plausible, to begin with, that in either universalization scenario assertions or 
implicatures, respectively, would cease to be taken seriously.) 
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verification—no means by which others may peer into one’s mind—to lie is to sully 
the one road of authoritative access to oneself and thereby cut oneself off from 
community with others. Doing so frustrates achievement of the compulsory moral 
ends associated with mutual understanding and cooperation.41  
Shiffrin distinguishes the wrong of lying from the wrong of deceiving (which she takes 
to involve a contradiction in conception). She does not distinguish the wrong of lying from 
the wrong of untruthfully implicating, however.42 On her view, it is speech, or linguistic 
communication, that constitutes the "one road of authoritative access" to each other's 
thoughts. But implicature is also part of linguistic communication, so untruthfully 
implicating would also seem to be acting on a maxim whose universalization would sully 
this critical tool. There does not seem to be anything in Shiffrin's account that would ground 
a moral difference between lying and untruthfully implicating. 
One possibility would be to supplement Shiffrin's account with a suggestion from 
Jonathan Webber. Like Shiffrin, Webber emphasizes our collective need to be able to rely on 
each other's testimony and claims that lying damages this ability more than untruthfully 
implicating. The reason for this, according to Webber, is that having lied makes both one's 
assertions and one's implicatures less credible, whereas having untruthfully implicated only 
makes one's implicatures less credible. 
Incorporating this claim into Shiffrin's account of the moral significance of lying, it 
might be argued that the liar's maxim, if applied universally, would make it irrational to 
trust either what speakers assert or what they implicate. By contrast, the rule by which the 
non-lying untruthful implicater acts, if applied universally, would only make it irrational to 
trust what speakers implicate. This would still leave us with the ability to rationally trust 
each other's assertions, arguably ensuring the needed basis for moral life, even in difficult 
circumstances where "the behavioral components of trust have frayed."43 44  
                                                        
41 Shiffrin (2014: 41). 
42 Recall that neither lying nor untruthfully implicating need be attempts to deceive. (See note 13.) 
43 Shiffrin emphasizes the importance of this ability for rational trust in difficult circumstances in a follow-
on piece. (2016: 244). 
44 Webber himself offers a different justification of the Difference Intuition that I confess to not grasping fully. 
He argues that because society needs reliable informants, and because liars compromise their own 
reliability more than untruthful implicaters, this "justifies society in reserving a more severe opprobrium 
for lying than is to be employed in response to misleading [defined here, roughly, as untruthful 
implicating]." Further: 
 Because it is right in this way for society to treat liars more severely than misleaders, each of us has 
good reason to mislead rather than to lie when faced with that choice. For each member of society 
has good reason to have a stronger negative attitude towards lying than towards misleading. Each 
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But why should we think that the liar's maxim, if applied universally, would make it 
irrational to trust either what speakers assert or what they implicate? Why would it not only 
make it irrational to trust what speakers assert, leaving what they implicate trustworthy 
enough?  
One potential rationale, suggested by Webber's discussion, is as follows. If it is not 
rational to trust what speakers assert, then it is not rational to treat speakers as cooperative. 
If it is not rational to treat speakers as cooperative, then it is not rational to draw any 
implicatures from their conversational contributions, because implicature is based on the 
assumption that speakers are cooperating in furthering conversational ends. So once the 
rationality of trusting assertions is lost, there is no possibility of a respite in trustworthy 
implicatures. 
This rationale is questionable. Suppose that the liar's maxim were universalized, so 
that it would not be rational to trust speakers' assertions (in the absence of specific grounds 
for trust). It is not clear why this should entail a general breakdown in cooperative 
communication. For instance, it might still be that people pose questions, make commands, 
and express feelings sincerely. Further, it might still be that people implicate sincerely, even 
when doing so via the sullied speech act of assertion (at least, in cases where what is 
implicated is independent of what is asserted.45) It might remain perfectly rational to trust 
implicatures (at least those that are independent of what a speaker asserts), despite its not 
being rational to trust assertions. 
This seems far-fetched because of the central role assertion actually plays in our 
communicative practice. We have the sense that if you could not trust what others straight-
out asserted, you could not trust them at all. Whereas, because we are familiar with 
Williams's "adversarial but rule-governed" contexts, we have the sense that there is still 
room for trusting assertions even when trust in implicatures is irrational. But there does not 
                                                        
of us needs to be able to rely on others as informants. We can still rely on misleaders, though we 
need to be careful, but cannot rely on liars. Each of us, therefore, has good reason to prefer to 
mislead than to lie, because according to the standards we ourselves ought to have, lying is more 
condemnable than misleading. (2013: 654) 
 One way of interpreting this might be along the lines of the Millian proposal discussed in Section 5 below. 
45 To illustrate: if I lie in asserting "John and Jane got married and had a baby," then I also untruthfully 
implicate that John and Jane got married first and had a baby second, since in order to do those two 
things in that order you have to do those two things. On the other hand, if I lie in asserting, "He has an 
excellent command of English and always comes on time to tutorials," I may nonetheless truthfully 
implicate that he is no good at philosophy. 
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seem to be any reason in principle that a breakdown of credibility in assertion would entail 
a breakdown of credibility in implicature, while a breakdown of credibility in implicature 
would not entail a breakdown of credibility in assertion. Indeed, in ordinary contexts, when 
someone is seen to untruthfully implicate it is likely that their credibility in assertion is 
reduced, as well as their credibility in implicature. 
In sum, it is not clear that there is a difference in universalizability between the liar's 
maxim and the non-lying untruthful implicater's maxim, either with respect to a 
contradiction in conception or a contradiction in willing.  
5. A Millian justification of the Difference Intuition 
All of the approaches to justifying the Difference Intuition just surveyed aim to show 
that the difference between lying and untruthfully implicating could make a difference to  
the moral status of an act, when all else is held equal. But I mentioned at the beginning of 
the chapter that one might reject this, but still uphold the Difference Intuition as shaping a 
proper moral decision procedure, or rule of thumb. In this section, I will explore such a 
justification, inspired by John Stuart Mill's discussion of lying.   
For simplicity, let us interpret Mill as a maximizing act-utilitarian. So interpreted, Mill 
advocated a rule of thumb against lying on the grounds that our ability to trust each other's 
assertions is "the principle support of all present social well-being" and that the 
"insufficiency" of this ability to trust each other's assertions "does more than any one thing 
that can be named to keep back civilisation, virtue, everything on which human happiness 
on the largest scale depends." Given that lying always weakens this transcendently 
important ability to some degree, lying will only very rarely produce better outcomes than 
truth-telling.46 
Mill of course allowed that the rule against lying would have exceptions, notably for 
cases in which "the withholding of some fact (as of information from a malefactor, or of bad 
news from a person dangerously ill) would preserve some one (especially a person other 
than oneself) from great and unmerited evil, and when the withholding can only be effected 
by denial." The last clause is interesting, since it suggests that the exception for lying only 
                                                        
46 Mill (1863: 32-3). 
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kicks in if the withholding of information cannot be effected without denying what one 
takes to be the truth—i.e., without lying outright. One way of withholding information 
without denying it is to untruthfully implicate. For instance, in the above example of the 
deathbed question, the respondent withholds the information that the woman's son has 
died without denying that he has died (as the respondent would if she said, "He is happy 
and healthy."). So it looks as though Mill's exception to the rule of thumb against lying 
suggests another rule of thumb: when some rule of thumb tells you to convey something 
you believe to be false, then, other things being equal, untruthfully implicate rather than lie. 
How might we justify a rule of thumb like this? Keeping focus on the damage that 
either lying or untruthfully implicating does to our ability to trust one another, and to "the 
cultivation in ourselves of a sensitive feeling on the subject of veracity,"47 we might argue 
along the following lines.  
One difference between lying and untruthfully implicating is that it is generally easier 
to be certain that someone has lied than that they have untruthfully implicated, since with 
implicating there may be room for uncertainty about what has been implicated, whereas 
there is not typically much room for uncertainty about what has been asserted. As Adler 
points out, this difficulty in determining and ascribing responsibility should not be confused 
with a lessening of responsibility.48 But from the present Millian point of view, it may be 
relevant that lies are more easily identified than untruthful implicatures and thus are more 
likely to negatively affect our trust in each other. This might be a reason to make it a rule to 
untruthfully implicate rather than lie in situations where another rule tells you to convey 
something you believe to be false. 
Those who untruthfully implicate also have an easier time denying their dishonesty, 
not only to others but also to themselves. Indeed, it seems plausible that many choices of 
untruthfully implicating over lying are motivated by a desire to be able to consider oneself 
an honest person. Moreover, by refraining from explicitly expressing something one 
believes to be false, one likely avoids some immediate feelings of shame. None of this makes 
the choice to untruthfully implicate honorable, but it may well make it beneficial in 
cultivating our sensitivity about truth telling. By untruthfully implicating instead of lying, 
one reminds oneself that one cares about truth and is an honest person. In avoiding the more 
                                                        
47 Mill (1863: 32). 
48 Adler (1997: 446). 
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intense shameful feelings produced by outright lying, one protects oneself from 
experiencing oneself so vividly as morally deficient. These effects may promote one's 
continued efforts to be honest, whereas choosing to lie might harden one to deception and 
dishonesty. 
Relatedly, it may be that outright lies, as compared with untruthful implicatures, make 
those lied to feel worse if they discover the lies. Both Adler and Saul point out that, at least 
in many cases, the effort to tell the truth to someone, even while trying to deceive her, shows 
greater respect for her than would just lying to her. At least, it usually shows that one is 
uncomfortable with what one is doing in attempting to deceive, that one is "squirming," as 
Adler puts it.49 When the truth is discovered, it may be that the deceived's memory of this 
effort will make her feel that the gravity of what was done to her was taken seriously. This 
might help to preserve her trust in others despite having been deceived. 
Of course, all of this relies on the truth of the suggested empirical generalizations 
about the effects of lying versus untruthfully implicating on our sensitivity to truthfulness 
and trust in each other. (It also depends on a defense of these things as contributing 
immensely to the goodness of outcomes overall, as Mill claimed they do.) I have offered 
some reasons for thinking that the correct empirical generalizations might favor 
untruthfully implicating. But one might argue in the other direction, and not unreasonably, 
it seems to me. 
First, the easier identifiability of lies compared with untruthful implicatures might 
contribute positively to our trust in one another by making it easier to identify and discuss 
instances of dishonesty. Second, instead of hardening people to deception and dishonesty, 
the undeniability of the lie and the shame associated with it might force people to 
acknowledge their dishonest moments and aim to make them as few as possible. By 
contrast, the ease of self-deception associated with untruthfully implicating might lead to 
complacency and shallowness about the importance of being honest and forthcoming. And 
finally, it may be that those on the receiving end of untruthful implicatures have their trust 
in others diminished more than those who are lied to. They may become more inclined to 
see others as crafty cheaters who want to have their cake by deceiving and eat it, too, by 
maintaining deniability. 
                                                        
49 Saul (2012: 78), Adler (1997: 452).   
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My hunch is that the empirical facts favor the first line of argument rather than the 
one in the opposite direction. But this is only a hunch. Quite likely, there is extant research 
in psychology and behavioral economics that would provide a useful basis from which to 
investigate the plausibility of either argument, or to develop a different one that would 
support or undermine a rule of thumb like the one Mill's comments suggest. I cannot pursue 
this here, but it seems like a promising route to justifying one form of the Difference 
Intuition (or the Reverse Difference Intuition) in a different way than has so far been 
attempted.    
6. Conclusion 
I began this chapter by trying to clarify the Difference Intuition: the somewhat 
widespread, somewhat firmly held sense that there is some moral advantage to untruthfully 
implicating over lying. I defined lying in terms of asserting, but remained open about what 
precise definition best captures our ordinary notion. Following Grice, I defined implicating 
as a way of meaning something without asserting it. I narrowed down the kind of untruthful 
implicating that should be compared with lying for purposes of evaluating whether there is 
a moral difference between them. Just as lying requires a robust form of assertion, so the 
kind of untruthful implicating to be compared with lying requires a robust form of 
implicating. I set out a number of ways in which the Difference Intuition might be 
sharpened. Most of these involve quantifying over contrast cases differing only with respect 
to lying versus untruthfully implicating, claiming that for all, most, or some such pairs, the 
case of lying is morally worse than the case of untruthfully implicating. But I also noted that 
the Difference Intuition could be sharpened to a claim about how we should make moral 
decisions, rather than a claim about contrast cases, and at the end of the chapter sketched a 
Mill-inspired strategy for justifying the Difference Intuition in this form.  
Before that, I surveyed three broad approaches to arguing that the lying/untruthfully 
implicating difference can make a difference to an act's moral status (whether in all cases, 
most cases, or some cases). The upshot of this survey is, I think, a cautious pessimism. 
Previous attempts come up short, and the additional possibilities that I suggested do not 
look especially promising. This, of course, does not show that no justificatory project along 
these lines could succeed. It only gives a flavor for the kinds of problems that need to be 
avoided. I am somewhat less pessimistic about the Millian approach outlined in section 5. 
While this approach would need much more development than I have given it, it has the 
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advantage of taking account of whatever empirical bases we may have, now or in the future, 
for thinking that some ways of speaking against our minds are in general more detrimental 
to the overall good than others. It may well be our sense of such generalizations that drive 
the intuition of moral difference in the first place. 
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